Evidence-based medicine – are we boiling the frog? by Muckart, David James Jackson
FORUM
447  July 2013, Vol. 103, No. 7  SAMJ
For more than 2 000 years, anecdotes, personal 
experience and bias dictated medical practice. Untold 
harm was caused by unsubstantiated proclamations 
such as that by Dupuytren, who held that under 
no circumstances could a structure as insignificant 
as the appendix be responsible for any abdominal mischief.[1] The 
traditional hierarchical training structure, whereby the consultant’s 
word was law, perpetuated such dogma.
Medical practitioners have now aligned themselves with their legal 
colleagues and a scientific standard of proof, based on best available 
evidence, is required to substantiate current practice. Unlike the 
legal system, however, scientific proof must reach a level of certainty 
greater than ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.[2] This has resulted in the 
construction of the evidence pyramid, but as with legal argument, the 
evidence provided by each level has been contested, strong opinions 
being voiced by opposing camps.[3,4] Even when performed with 
appropriate numbers of patients, assignment and blinding, bias may 
confound the best of randomised controlled trials.
Publication bias
A publishing bias against studies with negative or inconclusive 
findings exists.[5-7] Clinical trials in which the results show a significant 
difference are three times more likely to be accepted, and are likely 
to be published more rapidly, than those with insignificant findings. 
The exclusion of unpublished data may skew the findings of any 
meta-analysis. Furthermore, results that are detrimental to the tested 
product may even be deliberately suppressed by the manufacturer.[8-12]
Sponsorship by for-profit organisations
An analysis of 159 trials involving 12 different specialties concluded 
that there was a significant finding in favour of the trial drug if the study 
was funded by for-profit organisations, which could not be explained 
by methodology, statistical analysis or type of study.[13] A similar 
review found that 51% of studies funded by for-profit organisations 
were in favour of the trial drug, compared with only 16% of studies 
sponsored by non-profit organisations. [14] This must cast doubt upon 
the validity of certain conclusions. As stated by Angell (editor of 
the New England Journal of Medicine for two decades), ‘Physicians 
can no longer rely upon the medical literature for valid and reliable 
information.’ She reluctantly concludes that prescription drugs are not 
nearly as effective as the publications on randomised trials suggest.[11] 
An analysis of highly cited trials published in the three journals with 
the highest impact factors (New England Journal of Medicine, Lancet, 
Journal of the American Medical Association) and those with an impact 
factor greater than seven, showed that 30% of trials initially reporting 
highly significant positive findings were found in subsequent studies to 
either overestimate treatment effect or show no benefit.[15,16] The effect 
of funding extends beyond drug or equipment trials. Guidelines and 
consensus statements by panels of experts are frequently supported 
by industry, and the members of such panels may have financial 
affiliations with the sponsoring company.[11,17]
Ghost and guest authors
Ghost authorship takes two forms. In its benign form, professional 
medical writers may improve a manuscript without altering its 
scientific content. They may be acknowledged in the text but will 
not appear on the list of authors. A more malignant tendency has 
spread in industry-sponsored studies: the initial draft is compiled 
by company employees, before academically affiliated authors, often 
regarded as key opinion leaders, are sourced as principal or second 
authors without having substantially contributed to the study.[18]
Data fabrication
From painted mice to post-op pain relief, instances of trial misconduct 
and data fabrication have raised their ugly heads. This is cause for 
serious concern and casts a shadow over medical evidence. A recent 
analysis found that 2% of scientists admit to fabricating or modifying 
data at least once, and one-third confess to questionable research 
practices. Interrogating colleagues revealed more alarming figures of 
14% for data falsification and 72% for debatable scientific behaviour.[19]
Clinical versus statistical significance
The keystone in the bridge between clinical trials and conclusions 
is statistical significance. Simply put, it produces a mathematical 
probability of whether the results of a study comparing two or more 
groups are due to chance, a 5% risk of the results being falsely positive 
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deemed acceptable. As amusingly described by Hall,[20] this is not due 
to divine intervention but was the learned opinion of the statistician 
Fisher. In essence, it is therefore based on subjective expert opinion, 
the antithesis of evidence-based medicine. 
Statistical significance, however, may have little to do with clinical 
relevance and must not be confused with biological importance.[20] 
Luus et al.[21] suggest that clinically relevant differences and statistical 
significance concur only by coincidence. They emphasise that although 
clinicians need not be conversant with statistical methodology they 
should understand the results, and statisticians must have some 
understanding of the clinical problem in order to generate statistical 
results commensurate with meaningful clinical conclusions. Trials 
aim to determine whether the aspect under scrutiny will affect clinical 
practice, so results should be expressed in clinical, not mathematical, 
terms. The latter are very susceptible to sample size, and meaningless 
clinical differences may be statistically significant. The reverse also 
holds true if the sample size is too small. In his book The Last Well 
Person, Hadler[22] argues that no study can control for all confounders, 
and an absolute difference of less than 2%, even if mathematically 
significant, should be viewed with caution.
Of greater clinical relevance is the number needed to treat (NNT), 
the reciprocal of absolute risk reduction, which defines how many 
patients need to be treated for one to gain benefit.[23] This calculation 
has no correlation with probability values, but gives an assessment of 
clinical impact. Of equal or greater importance is the number needed 
to harm (NNH), which assesses the possible adverse consequences 
of a particular intervention. The POISE (Post Operative Ischaemic 
Evaluation) study epitomises these concepts. [24] This is the largest 
randomised controlled trial to assess whether the risks of postoperative 
cardiovascular events can be lowered by peri-operative beta-blockade. 
A highly significant reduction in non-fatal myocardial infarctions was 
found in the treated group, with an NNT of 66. The incidence of stroke 
doubled, however, with the NNH being 200. For every three patients 
spared a cardiac event, one would potentially suffer a cerebral insult. 
Among those in the treatment group who suffered a stroke, only 15% 
regained full function, and 26% were left severely incapacitated. The 
choice between the risk and sequelae of a non-fatal myocardial infarct 
versus a disabling stroke is a matter of clinical judgement and patient 
preference, not mathematical probability.
Errors in clinical trials
Errors in clinical trials may be random or systematic. The former 
is unpredictable and may skew data both positively and negatively. 
An increase in sample size reduces its occurrence. Systematic error 
is not eliminated by increasing the sample size, and arises when a 
trend in the data occurs that is actually false. This results from three 
types of bias, namely selection, misclassification and confounding. 
Selection bias occurs when a test is inadvertently skewed to favour a 
subset of patients. Misclassification bias describes the error of placing 
patients in an incorrect category, resulting in a heterogeneous rather 
than homogeneous population under scrutiny. This is especially true 
where standard therapies are normally titrated against physiological 
end-points rather than fixed dose regimens. Deans et al.[25] cite the 
acute respiratory distress syndrome low tidal volume trial as a prime 
example; patients were randomised to fixed tidal volumes of either 
6 ml/kg or 12 ml/kg, whereas the standard practice would be to titrate 
treatment in accordance with airway pressures and compliance. The 
identical scenario pertains to transfusion triggers. Younger patients 
without coronary artery disease may tolerate a lower haemoglobin 
level than the elderly cardiopath, and conversely, overtransfusion in the 
young may have a detrimental effect.[26] Such insufficient or excessive 
therapy may contribute substantially to differences in the trial results. 
Confounding bias refers to the mistaken relationship found between 
two variables because of a third unaccounted factor.
The boiling frog
There is a physiological anecdote that if a frog is placed in boiling water, 
it will leap out immediately. If the water is initially tepid, however, and 
slowly heated to boiling point, the frog will remain until boiled alive. 
This example has been used in various scenarios, including economics 
and global warming, to illustrate the concept that slow change may pass 
unrecognised until harm occurs. From initially tepid waters the zeal 
for evidence-based practice has now reached boiling point, and if the 
shortcomings are not appreciated, evidence-based medicine may itself 
become a boiled frog. The concept is disease and not patient orientated, 
is not scientifically perfect, and must not be viewed as exclusive.[27] As 
Osler observes, ‘Variability is the law of life and no two individuals 
react alike and behave alike under the abnormal conditions which we 
know as disease. The good physician treats the disease, the great one 
treats the patient.’[28]
As in criminal law, even if the evidence is beyond reasonable doubt, 
it is rarely unequivocal or indisputable; evidence is not synonymous 
with truth. Even in modern practice the aphorism of Osler still holds 
true, ‘Medicine is a science of uncertainty and an art of probability.’[29] 
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